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Dear Mama, 
 
I hope you are not mad. I want to help 
you but it’s complicated. I go to school 
every day. I am learning English but it is 
hard. I am not working. I want to but it’s 
prohibited. I promise you that I will do 
my best in everything I do. I will find a 
way to help you. I will not forget you. 
 
I like my mother here but you are my 
real mother. You will always be my real 
mom. 
 
I love you. 
—Johanna, 16-year-old 
Mexican girl in foster care 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between the state, the family, and the child is a 
fundamental unit of analysis in society. The law and social norms that 
shape this triad inform the ways adults care and provide for their children. 
Parents also affect the ways children are socialized into the community, 
allowing for social continuity over time and space. In the United States, the 
nature of this relationship has shifted over time as have the roles that 
children are recognized as playing in this relationship. The growing 
presence of unaccompanied children (an individual under the age of 
eighteen who has no lawful immigration status in the United States and 
who has no parent or legal guardian to provide care and custody) 
challenges how institutional and legal conceptualizations of childhood 
pathologize the migrant child and the transnational family.  
In this article, I provide an overview of the socio-legal factors that 
shape the relationship between the child, the family, and the state, and the 
ways migrant children’s lives have come to be defined and contested. The 
legal identity of migrant children is socially situated within a history that 
intertwines social movements of helping professionals, legal jurisdictions 
characterized by increasingly intolerant approaches to juveniles, and shifts 
in the treatment of unauthorized migrant children under immigration law 
over time. When there is a perceived rupture in the social norm of the 
nuclear family, particularly in moments of crisis (such as parental death, 
abandonment, divorce, abuse, or neglect) the state often enters and acts 
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as the mediator of domestic relations.1(pxiv-xv),2 While historically and 
culturally decontextualized, child migration is increasingly identified as a 
threat to healthy childhood and an indication of familial rupture. For 
unaccompanied children in federal detention facilities run by the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement (ORR)*, this evolving series of actions and 
interventions shape how ORR evaluates parental competence and fitness, 
and how courts make custody determinations. In a globalized world like 
todays, this triangular relationship between children, families, and the 
state is becoming increasingly complex and dynamic. Social policies and 
legal norms are lagging behind the diverse and fluid domestic 
arrangements of transnational families. As an unintended but powerful 
consequence, the relationships between unaccompanied children and 
their kin are getting strained and, in some instances, severed. 
I begin by tracing how creation of the juvenile court and emergence 
of the tutelary complex has radically shifted the notion of children as legal 
subjects in the United States. I analyze the legal case of Polovchak v. 
Meese, a critical precursor to a relatively new form of legal recourse for 
some migrant children—the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status. SIJ is 
a form of legal relief available to migrant children who have been abused, 
abandoned or neglected. An unauthorized child may pursue a finding of 
abuse, abandonment and neglect in state court, and then apply for a SIJ 
visa from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Through this 
hybrid process between state courts and federal immigration law, SIJ is 
the only provision in immigration law that considers the child’s best 
interests. However, in practice, I argue that SIJ ensnares migrant youth 
                                                          
**
 In 2003 with the reorganization of Homeland Security, the care of unaccompanied 
children transferred from Immigration and Naturalization Services (now known as 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement) to the Office of Refugee Resettlements Division 
of Unaccompanied Children’s Services. While less restrictive than the rented bed space 
in juvenile jails that housed unaccompanied children under the INS, ORR detention 
facilities, euphemistically called “shelters”, are not experienced as such. Children 
constantly are monitored by security cameras, watched and counted continuously by 
staff, permitted to leave the facility only when supervised at particular staff-to-child ratios, 
restricted to communication with one or two preapproved family members by phone for 
twenty minutes per week. Most facilities have locked, alarmed doors and windows. Staff 
documents medical and mental health sessions, behaviors, personal communication, 
phone calls, and visits with advocates within the child’s institutional file, which is freely 
shared with law enforcement upon request. As a total institution, every action and 
reaction is subject to surveillance and documentation in the child’s ORR file. Staff 
members remind children that misbehavior will affect their “case,” widely understood by 
children as their release and long-term permanency in the United States.   
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between competing allegiances to the state and to the family. Through the 
narratives and social agency of young people like Johanna, whose letter 
opened this article, we may recognize the gravity of these forces on the 
ways youth and their families navigate the complex and uneven terrain of 
everyday life. 
 
Research Methods 
Unaccompanied children are economic, political, and social migrants who 
arrive both lawfully and unlawfully, and originate from many countries 
around the globe. They face similar challenges to those of other 
populations of migrants, confronting language barriers, intergenerational 
conflict, cultural assimilation, and limited access to resources. But what 
remains unique are the ways the law and institutions frame children 
seemingly without parents or kinship ties. Independent or unattached, 
migrant children bereft of family or kinship networks therefore threaten the 
notion of how children can and should act. Their unauthorized presence 
and exercise of “independent” agency calls into question the state’s 
reliance on the nuclear family as the site for producing future citizens. The 
figure of the “unaccompanied alien child” challenges dominant Western 
conceptualizations of child dependence and passivity explicitly through 
their unauthorized and independent presence in the United States and 
implicitly in the ways they move through multiple geographic and 
institutional sites. Thus, migrant children become a problem remaining to 
be solved.  
This article draws from a large, multi-sited ethnography on the 
complex institutions and actors that emerge when children migrate 
clandestinely from Central America and Mexico to the United States, and 
the ways young people understand the law, institutional interventions, and 
their own best interests.3 While the larger study focuses on how young 
migrants navigate legal and institutional processes, this article narrows its 
gaze to the specific form of legal relief, SIJ, being increasingly utilized on 
behalf of unaccompanied children. As such, my fieldwork focused on four 
contexts. First, I conducted participant observation in highly restrictive and 
largely inaccessible spaces of immigration detention, immigration and 
family courts, and federal foster care programs for unaccompanied 
children.† I conducted multiple, one-on-one interviews with 82 detained 
                                                          
†
 In order to conduct research, I secured permission not only from my university’s 
institutional review board and two of the organizations’ research review committees but 
also from the thirteen other individuals and organizations who laid claim to speak for the 
best interests of the child, a two year process. Although the director of the ORR Division 
of Children’s Services is the legal guardian of all detained “unaccompanied alien children” 
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and non-detained children from 19 countries, many of whom qualified for 
the Special Immigrant Juvenile status. It is their experiences I focus on in 
this article. 
Second, I conducted one-on-one structured and semi-structured 
interviews with nearly 350 “stakeholders”—individuals engaged in the 
apprehension and detention of migrant children, including government 
bureaucrats, nongovernmental facility staff, attorneys, guardians ad litem, 
state court and immigration judges, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) agents, foster families, teachers and policymakers 
across multiple sites in Texas, Arizona, Illinois, New York, Maryland, and 
Virginia. Situated within these interviews, I focused on stakeholder 
accounts of SIJ that exemplify the tensions and contradictions in the 
relationship between children, families, and the state within the larger 
study.   
Third, I collected and analyzed the various types of institutional 
paperwork produced by governmental and nongovernmental 
“stakeholders” tracking the presence of unaccompanied youth in federal 
custody in the United States, including custody transfer forms between 
ICE, ORR, detention centers and families; immigration applications and 
rulings; and fingerprint and photographic records—each asserting the 
lawful or unlawful status of the youth’s tenuous presence in the United 
States. I analyzed the marks of the state through genres of writing and 
practices connecting youth to the state. This focus on institutional 
paperwork, in combination with legal analysis of shifts in the law, provides 
a critical space in the analysis of youth agency as it provides an avenue 
through which to consider how youth are influenced by institutions they 
encounter, and how they shape those institutions simultaneously. While 
the law is often assumed to be impermeable, youth as social actors 
dynamically interact and engage with the law and legal practices. By 
focusing on the persistence of certain legal notions of childhood over time 
amid specific moments of legal change, I examine how the law 
simultaneously reflects change and continuity in the space of childhood, 
even as it shapes their daily lives.4 
Fourth, I conducted ethnographic research with a sample of 20 
youth and their families in the US, several of whom pursued SIJ following 
release from detention. This longitudinal approach allowed me to track 
change over time, and to observe the intended and unintended 
                                                                                                                                                               
in the United States, other state and nonstate actors recognized themselves as integrally 
involved in the care and custody of unaccompanied children. For additional discussion on 
the ethical and methodological considerations taken in conducting research with migrant 
children, see Heidbrink 2014.  
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consequences of SIJ on young people and their families.   
 
Children as Legal Subjects  
In this section, I examine the emergence of children as legal subjects in 
the United States with a specific focus on the relationships of migrant 
children with their families. Colonial law in America perceived the family as 
a unit of labor led by the male head of household with the wife and 
children as subordinate members who maintained no independent power. 
Fathers maintained “an almost limitless right to the custody of their minor 
legitimate children.”5(p54) The state relied on family unity as a mechanism 
for economic and social governance, in which the patriarch wielded 
uncontested power in the domestic sphere. Nineteenth-century family law 
followed the tradition of English law by not recognizing children as 
individual rights holders independent of their parents; instead, the interests 
of the family were seen as synonymous with the patriarch’s wishes. 
According to Michael Grossberg’s study of nineteenth-century family law, 
the law considered children as wage-earning assets of their fathers, in 
which “their services, earnings and the like became the property of their 
paternal masters in exchange for life and maintenance.”6(p25) In moments 
of transgression of the law, children were acknowledged as individuals, 
but there was minimal distinction between children and adults, subjecting 
children as young as seven to the harsh gaze of adult criminal courts.  
Nineteenth century marked a critical shift in the ways both women 
and children were viewed. What Stanley Cohen termed, a profound “moral 
panic” emerged concerning gangs of children overstepping the confines of 
childhood and threatening “societal values and interests,” particularly 
among new immigrant communities.7(p9),8,9(p63) The financial demands on 
working and lower-class immigrant households often necessitated that 
both parents work multiple jobs, leaving children in the care of others or 
depending on divergent notions of care and child independence, at times 
leaving them unattended with limited supervision. Children’s exposure to 
peers and to the street was perceived as a strong enticement into bad 
habits. Specialized police organizations emerged to track crime, while 
philanthropic and religious organizations developed special schools and 
programs to inoculate against the contagions of youth delinquency. 
Through monitoring and controlling the negative habits of youth, a 
specialized pedagogy emerged to intervene in the lives of children 
“beyond parental control.”10(p156)  
From the 1820s to the 1920s, the child-saving movement 
coalesced, in which middle and upper-class American reformers sought a 
humanitarian response to youth delinquency. The reformers, who came to 
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be known as the “child savers,” sought to protect children from both the 
vagaries of the street and increased automobile traffic, which claimed the 
lives of an increasing number of immigrant children accustomed to playing 
in the streets.11 Through restricting children’s movements to schools, 
playgrounds, and playrooms in the name of their own safety and well-
being, the child savers sought to provide children moral education and to 
instill social behavioral standards. They labored to ensure the “salvation” 
of troublesome youth through institutional interventions designed to 
safeguard children against parental inattention and neglect. By the 20th 
century, reformers had established settlement houses—large homes in 
densely populated urban areas where predominantly immigrant families 
could engage in education, seek repose from factory life, and receive 
medical care.  
Anthony Platt has convincingly argued that in their quest to 
preserve the purity and innocence of childhood, the child savers “invented 
new categories of youthful misbehavior” that corresponded to the 
behaviors of youth in predominantly urban, immigrant ghettos.12(p3) 
Recognizing the family as the primary means of instilling morality and 
social values, the child savers developed a series of programs for children 
and families to instill American values in the newly arrived immigrant 
families. For those families requiring more substantial intervention and 
rehabilitation, the child savers developed reformatory schools to serve as 
surrogate families for youth, shaping impressionable children to an ethic of 
obedience, labor, discipline, and morality. By the early 20th century, 
Progressive Era reformers had fundamentally altered the relationship 
between the state, the family, and the child—no longer did a patriarch 
have absolute possession and control over his child; the state had begun 
monitoring the community’s social investment in the child.  
The transition to the pedagogical state at the turn of the century in 
the United States exemplifies this dynamic relationship through the 
institutionalization and dissemination of self-governance, guidance of the 
family and children, management of the household, and care of the soul at 
a particular historical moment11,12 State interventions were not exclusively 
reserved for migrant children and families but reached to communities 
along racial and class lines. The child savers and the courts began to 
speak a “politics of truth,” generating new forms of knowledge and news 
technologies of regulation and intervention. Perhaps the most lauded 
innovation of early reformers was the establishment of the first juvenile 
court in Illinois in 1899 and its transformation into a national system in 
1908. The juvenile court was founded on the British legal doctrine of 
parens patrie, “parent of the nation,” in which the state serves as the 
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metaphoric head of household. The court’s founding act claims that the 
institution’s goal was “to regulate the treatment and control of dependent, 
neglected, and delinquent children.”13(p458) The juvenile courts brought 
together a spectrum of children viewed as delinquents and as victims of 
parental neglect. In court, a perception of “parental neglect” justified the 
active involvement of the state as a means of safeguarding the lives of 
children.‡ Philanthropic organizations not only became instrumental in 
defining the criteria of neglect and proper expressions of care, but also 
became folded into the institutional apparatus of the state by serving as 
probation officers, directly shaping the court’s decisions in cases of 
neglect and delinquency. Philanthropic organizations were a form of 
government concerned with “the conduct of conduct” governing both 
themselves and others.14(p48) The categories of care and protection began 
to move more fluidly across philanthropic and state boundaries, laying the 
foundation for the emergence of a shadow state of civil society. At the 
same time, the courts and philanthropic organizations became 
instrumental in shifting the responsibility for these newly defined behaviors 
and social risks, be they delinquency, illness, or poverty, from the state to 
the individual subject (and family) responsible for his or her care. 
Since its inception, the juvenile court has expanded its 
interventionist role within the family in the interest of, as officers of the 
court see it, the well-being of the child.15§ Child savers argued that juvenile 
courts were a revolutionary innovation that provided needed diagnosis and 
training to delinquent youth. Imbued with progressive ideals, the court was 
designed to respond to delinquency by viewing the criminality of youth as 
a consequence of psychological problems spurred by familial neglect and 
not as a manifestation of a child’s depraved nature. Seeking to protect and 
provide for this inherently vulnerable population, the court began to 
emphasize children’s rights, which “operated both as standards for 
                                                          
‡
 Previously, cases involving children and youth were brought before a local criminal 
court, which issued rulings based on laws also regulating adult actions. The act not only 
created a separate court with a single judge to adjudicate claims of children under age 
sixteen, but also provided for a separate space for proceedings, for prohibitions on 
children under twelve serving jail time, and for a court-appointed probation officer not 
paid by the state to represent the interests of the child before the court (Illinois Juvenile 
Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131, cited in Schultz 1973, p458). 
§
 For example, in 1943, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts intervened in the case of a 
nine-year-old Jehovah’s Witness preaching on public streets. The court determined that 
the child’s caregiver had violated state child labor laws by asking the child to distribute 
flyers in exchange for contributions. Amid claims that the state’s intervention violated the 
child’s right to religious freedom and the caregiver’s right to raise the child, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the state’s intervention was constitutional (Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), cited in Lloyd 2006: 237). 
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parental behavior and as limitations on parental power. Parental failure to 
live up to these standards violated children’s rights and justified 
community intervention.”16(p1052),17(p979) Furthermore, by distinguishing 
between adults and children, juvenile courts sought to shield youth from 
the harmful gaze of the criminal courts and to offer tailored interventions 
focused on the needs of the child instead of the offense.18,19(p108) Child 
savers argued that by focusing on the underlying problem instead of on 
the manifested behaviors, the courts sought to act in the “best interests of 
the child,” the legal principle that still prevails in contemporary juvenile 
courts. Under this rubric, the state could interject itself directly into family 
life in order to ensure appropriate therapeutic interventions for children.  
Rooted in a medical model of deviance that views “abnormal” 
behavior as a dysfunction of the individual, the juvenile courts provided a 
technology for charitable organizations not only to control delinquent youth 
socially through the law but also to shape the normative structure of the 
court.19(p109)  Platt argues that the juvenile court movement in the United 
States extended beyond a purely humanitarian concern for adolescents 
and became a mechanism for assimilation.12 He writes, “It was not by 
accident that the behavior selected for penalization by the child savers—
drinking, begging, roaming the streets, frequenting dance halls and 
movies, fighting, sexuality, staying out late at night, and incorrigibility—
was primarily attributable to the children of lower-class migrant and 
immigrant families.”12(p139)  
The concluding section of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 
reads, “This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose 
may be carried out, to wit: that the care, custody, and discipline of a child 
shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its 
parents, and in all cases where it can properly be done the child be placed 
in an improved family home and become a member of the family by legal 
adoption or otherwise.”13(p458) In effect, the state via the courts broke from 
its paternalistic position to a metaphoric head of household, distributing 
justice or punishment as “should be given by its parents.” When the “care, 
custody, and discipline” did not approximate that of a parent, the court 
could intervene as a parent “should” to preserve the mental and physical 
hygiene of the child. This constellation of spatial, social, and legal reforms 
marked a critical shift in allegiance, in which a child’s “highest duty was no 
longer obedience to parents, but preparation for citizenship.”16(p1051)  The 
culturally normative position of the law and the juvenile court used 
deviance of youth behavior and parenting practices as a justification for 
the state’s intervention in family life, disproportionately affecting immigrant 
families whose domestic arrangements and practices were different. The 
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law became a critical site, reflecting broader changes in the forms of care, 
discipline and governance that emerged from the state and charitable 
organizations during this time period.  
The juvenile court became “a visible form of the state-as-family” 
through the tutelary complex, an apparatus of laws and helping 
professionals, ranging from psychiatrists to social workers to judges, who 
determined the spectrum of norms and deviance in children.20(p104) Public 
supervision of children and their families through clinical observation, 
psychiatric evaluation, social work visitation, and court hearings replaced 
customary means of discipline and punishment of children in reformatory 
schools, mental institutions, prisons and work camps. Professionals 
claiming to know the natural state of childhood and the proper behaviors 
of youth aided in the rehabilitation of deviant youth, the supposed aim of 
the juvenile court system.11,12,20 By focusing efforts on the child as a 
subject instead of focusing on the act, like adult courts did, the tutelary 
complex institutionalized childhood through the state, family, and 
education system beyond the normalization tactics it enacted, thereby 
raising panopticism to a new level.21 
In The Policing of Families, Jacques Donzelot argues that the 
liberal state was caught between two inclinations: preserving social order 
and maintaining the autonomy found in the private lives of families.20 With 
the hope that private consumption of their moral guidance would yield 
public good, philanthropic organizations understood families as a site of 
social intervention, distributing advice on financial savings or targeting the 
housing of the poor with medical and hygienic sanitation 
interventions.20(p92) Despite strategies of resistance, the family became a 
mechanism for mediation between individuals and the state.20(p94) 
Donzelot argues that “government through families” replaced “government 
of families.”20(p48) 
Donzelot’s genealogy of the social control of the family remains 
relevant in the United States today not only for its delineation of the ways 
charitable organizations serve as an extension of and vital informant to 
legal judgments but also for its insight into how the family is subject to the 
state’s impersonal regulation of private life. Particularly for unaccompanied 
children in “shelters”, federally-subcontracted nongovernmental 
organizations serve at once as prison guards, rehabilitative experts, and 
probation officers. In the absence of family, family reunification specialists, 
social workers, and clinicians become regulators of children’s behaviors 
and of the legitimacy and quality of parenting practices. There is an 
institutional presumption that parents of unaccompanied migrant children 
are unfit by virtue of their child’s status as “unaccompanied”—at the 
9
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moment of apprehension, a child was not in the custody of a parent or 
customary care provider. Constructed as it may be, the juridical category 
of the “unaccompanied alien child” marks a rupture in the social unit of the 
nuclear family and calls into question a parent’s capacity to attend to the 
child’s “care, custody, and discipline.” Only though completing a rigorous 
series of institutional paperwork and enduring scrutiny by charitable 
organizations may parents regain custody of their children from the federal 
government. In the interim, facility staff are charged with the education, 
socialization, and monitoring of children’s behaviors.3  
In the 1960s, we see another shift in the courts from a pedagogical 
to an increasingly punitive approach to youth. High levels of incarceration, 
zero-tolerance policies, and fast-track adjudication point to those courts’ 
contemporary concerns with prosecuting youth instead of providing 
excessive counseling. Juvenile courts in the United States continue to 
request the supervision and rehabilitative services of social service 
agencies, but organizations remain overwhelmed with the demand and 
are underfunded and understaffed. Distinct from earlier claims of saving 
youth or of preserving childhood, the current U.S. court system reveals 
repressive and controlling tactics. The increasing notoriety of both the 
police and the prosecutors, who investigate and arrest youth, places 
juvenile justice in a new light, in contrast to the early twentieth-century 
emphasis of the courts as in loco parentis.  
During the same time period, the U.S. Supreme Court teetered 
between granting some essential rights to children and repealing other 
provisions affecting children’s equal standing in the courts.** The U.S. 
                                                          
**
 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); in June 1964, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was taken 
into custody after being accused of making lewd telephone calls; finding him to be 
delinquent, a juvenile court judge ordered him to be committed to the State Industrial 
School until he reached majority (a period of six years); his parents petitioned the Arizona 
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain their son’s release; the court referred 
the case back to the original judge, who dismissed the habeas petition; the Gaults 
appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which agreed that due process should apply to 
delinquency proceedings, but held that due process requirements were not offended by 
the proceedings in the Gault case, and affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The case 
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the Arizona decision, ruling 
that a child has a constitutional guarantee to protection and to due process when he or 
she is committed to a state institution such as a juvenile detention facility. The juvenile 
court must afford children a notice of charges, a right to counsel, the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination. Yet, in 1971, the 
Supreme Court denied a child’s right to a trial by jury, making made a fundamental 
distinction: children possess rights only inasmuch as they do not conflict with the priorities 
and social expectations of the state’s behavioral norms and expectations of children 
located in the family and society.  
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Supreme Court has observed that children possess a special status under 
the law: “Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that 
minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and 
responsible than adults. Particularly during the formative years of 
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective 
and judgment expected of adults.”22(p831)†† In many ways, early rulings‡‡ 
not only further institutionalized a cultural construction of childhood that 
was put forward by the early reformers but also relegated children to 
second-class citizenship within the state. Contemporary state and federal 
courts consistently view children as individuals who do not possess rights 
and agency equivalent to those of adults. Furthermore, while such rulings 
do make special accommodations and distinctions in the treatment of 
children as distinct from adults, it is critical to note that these provisions 
are not binding in federal immigration courts in their treatment of 
unauthorized children. The few rights granted to youth in state and federal 
courts do not extend to unauthorized youth in immigration court.  
Historically, youth has been a contentious category in which the 
members benefit from some specialized provisions due to their perceived 
dependence and vulnerability, while they are simultaneously excluded 
from the rights afforded adults. The courts have increasingly assumed an 
interventionist role in the domestic sphere, attempting to protect children 
from abusive parents. The 1980s and early 1990s brought a renewed 
emphasis on and sensitivity toward child abuse. While laudable, it 
bolstered the state’s ability to intervene in a parent-child relationship 
particularly in cases of abuse and of dangerous or inadequate parenting.§§ 
Congress “created incentives for states to provide permanency for 
children on whose behalf the state had intervened to sever the family 
relationship.”15(237-238) Unauthorized children who are abused, abandoned, 
or neglected in theory are subject to state intervention similar to that 
accorded to documented youth.  
While the expansion of state intervention in the domestic sphere of 
the family explicitly and profoundly shapes the lives of all youth, in many 
ways unauthorized migrant youth are excluded from any of the positive 
measures such strategies may have. Within federal detention facilities for 
unaccompanied children, institutional interventions remain predicated on 
                                                          
††
 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) in which the court ruled 
that youth is a mitigating factor in the death sentence of a sixteen-year-old. 
‡‡
 See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970). 
§§
 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997; and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000 (see, e.g., Lloyd 2006). 
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middle-class norms of childhood and parenting practices that place 
immigrant youth in a marginalized and often tenuous position in 
relationship to their families and to the state. This is particularly acute for 
unauthorized children who do not benefit from unconditional protection 
from the state due to their unauthorized presence in the United States. At 
the state level, a child welfare system can remove a child, whether 
documented or undocumented, from an abusive parent and provide care 
through state foster care programs, but on their eighteenth birthday, 
unauthorized children re-embody their unauthorized status, unable to live 
or work lawfully in the United States. In spite of the legal justification for 
state intervention and its intense and sustained involvement, which 
includes removing children from their parents, the state effectively 
abandons such children on their eighteenth birthday. The protection of 
children from abusive families and from the state that seeks to deport 
them is predicated on children’s ability to navigate the law amid restricted 
rights, limited accommodations, and marginal standing within the courts. 
This fluctuating relationship between the child and the state becomes 
particularly problematic for the ways in which youth conceive of their future 
selves amid significant uncertainty.  
In spite of the above-detailed shifts in how the law conceptualizes 
children, contemporary federal immigration law still frames immigrant 
children as objects, analogous to now-discarded notions of children as 
property, recognizing the identity of a child only inasmuch as that child is a 
derivative of the actions, legal status, and presence of his or her 
parent(s).*** U.S. immigration law is predominantly family-based, 
presuming that adults are the decision makers and providers for children. 
Children exist as derivatives of adult petitions or as dependents that are 
petitioned for by their parent or legal guardian in family reunification 
applications. Given this, children must rely on their parents to access the 
law, while the children forfeit any individual relationship to the state in 
immigration law. In the context of immigration law, children are not 
acknowledged as individuals, nor do they possess specific rights or social 
agency autonomously. Immigration law is an anomaly—the exclusive form 
of law that does not consider or even acknowledge the status or needs of 
children outside their relationship to their parents. To be clear, other areas 
of law have not necessarily gotten it right or are unworthy of critique.†††  
                                                          
***
 Legal scholar David Thronson (2002) skillfully traces the ways immigration law both 
mirrors and buttresses historic approaches to the rights of children, attending specifically 
to the adverse consequences that impact their experiences with the law.  
†††
 For example, contract law considers a contract voidable based on a child’s minor 
status, and tort law either releases children from any liability at all or affords them flexible 
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For unaccompanied children, the inability to access the state and 
the law directly becomes highly problematic. Immigration law consistently 
frames children as variables or liminal figures and not as actors in or 
involved contributors to migration decisions. The law does not view 
children as autonomous individuals from birth, but as beings that families 
must socialize into mature adults. The law views unaccompanied children 
without a legally recognized caregiver as existing alone though 
paradoxically still dependent. Without a recognizable parent, the child 
cannot access the state to petition for legal relief. At the same time, the 
legal identity of unaccompanied children is contingent because of their 
illegal presence in the United States. Unaccompanied children are 
“impossible subjects,” to enlist Mae Ngai’s term.23 Their presence is 
“simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred 
from citizenship and without rights.”23(p4)  
 
Immigration law remains the only area of law that has made no 
legally binding distinction between adults and children in the adjudication 
of legal petitions. Immigration law does not provide any compulsory child-
specific accommodations customary in family and juvenile courts. Under 
these laws children do not have a right to state-funded attorneys but must 
secure and pay for their own representation during immigration 
proceedings; there is no best-interest legal standard that takes into 
account the safety and well-being of the child; the rules of evidence 
remain the same for children and adults, forcing children to meet the same 
credibility and evidentiary requirements as adults; and child applicants 
cannot petition for their siblings or parents as derivatives in their 
applications for political asylum.24 As one attorney remarked, “You can put 
a baby in a basinet before an immigration judge and she would have to 
make her claim just like a forty-five-year-old man would” (personal 
interview). However, court records are abundant with examples of youth 
challenging this static framework. The sheer presence of a growing 
number of unaccompanied children speaks to the legal challenges that 
result from ignoring youth as rights holders capable of social and political 
agency. The case of Walter Polovchak is one such example.  
 
The Littlest Defector  
                                                                                                                                                               
liability given their “intelligence, maturity, and experience” (Bien 2004: 830; Bhabha and 
Schmidt 2006: 46). Under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, criminal law affords 
children special procedures with a stated intent of “rehabilitation” instead of punishment, 
harking back to the reformist’s initial intent for assistance rather than punishment for the 
court in 1899. 
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In January 1980, two citizens of the Soviet Union, Michael and Anna 
Polovchak, came to the United States with their three children, residing 
temporarily in Chicago. After a few months, they decided to return to the 
USSR, but their two eldest children, Nataly (17 years old) and Walter (12 
years old), refused to return with them. Nataly and Walter left the family 
home in Chicago to live with a cousin. Disagreeing with their decision, 
Michael and Anna Polovchak asked the police to force Walter to return to 
their home in Chicago. The police took Walter from his cousin’s home, but 
instead of returning him to his parents, they held him because Walter 
feared his parents would force him to return to the Soviet Union. After 
consulting with the State Department and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS), the police initiated custody proceedings in 
Cook County Circuit Court. The trial judge temporarily placed Walter in the 
state’s custody, “as a minor in need of supervision.” “Later that same day 
Walter, with his attorney but without his parents, filed an application for 
asylum with the regional INS office.”25‡‡‡ Walter’s application for asylum 
was granted and in October 1981 his status was changed to that of a 
“permanent resident alien.” The state trial court held a hearing on Walter’s 
wardship and eventually adjudicated both Walter and Nataly as wards of 
the court, removing them from their parents’ custody. The Illinois Appellate 
Court reversed that decision in December 1981, “determining that the 
Polovchaks should not have been deprived of parental custody,”25 but the 
parents had returned to the Soviet Union by that time. The Illinois 
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision in May 1983. The 
district court initially determined that “the private interest of…Walter...is by 
its very nature considerably less than that of his parents.”25 In the absence 
of his parents, who, as the adult family members, maintained Walter’s 
legal status and to whom his lawful presence was contingent, Walter was 
unauthorized to remain in the United States. A fierce and very public 
debate ensued. In a context of Cold War politics, protecting a child who 
chose “freedom” over “communism” raised the stakes.  
In the Illinois Appellate Court’s view, Walter’s parents had a 
fundamental right to make decisions about their child’s care and custody 
and, given his young age of 12, those rights superseded Walter’s desire to 
remain in the United States. Walter’s age became the centerpiece of a 
debate on parental rights. Just five years older, Nataly maintained a visa 
independent of her parents, and, as a result, her parents did not legally 
contest her decision to remain in the United States. However, the 
appellate court’s ruling was later complicated by Walter’s petition for 
                                                          
‡‡‡
 Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Circuit, 1985).  
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political asylum in federal immigration court based on his fear of 
persecution as a practicing Baptist in the Soviet Union. Walter was quickly 
granted political asylum and, in the context of Cold War politics, heralded 
as “the littlest defector.” Discontented with the ruling, Walter’s parents 
petitioned the federal court, stating that “the grant of asylum violated 
substantive constitutional rights protecting their privacy and the integrity of 
their family, as well as their right to raise and control their son and to 
participate in his major life decisions.”25  
The tensions that emerge in this case reverberate through the lives 
of unaccompanied children more than 30 years later. The legal case 
Polovchak v. Meese illustrates the still-conflicting and disparate 
conceptualizations of a child’s legal identity between family and 
immigration courts and the legislators that guide their rulings. State family 
courts traditionally adjudicate family disputes, given their recognized 
expertise in child welfare and the organizational apparatus in which to 
provide services and monitor compliance. By granting Walter political 
asylum, the federal government in effect made a custody determination, 
not only denying the parents legal standing but also ultimately conflicting 
with the wishes of the parents. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the federal 
government is obligated to provide protection to those who are persecuted 
in their country of origin. While parental rights ultimately were not 
terminated in this case, Walter was temporarily deemed a ward of the 
state prior to receiving political asylum. Without receiving notice from the 
court, his parents, who had since returned to the Soviet Union, had been 
excluded from the political asylum process affecting their son. When the 
parent is absent, the state serves as the legal guardian with the autonomy 
to decide what is in the best interest of the child, which necessarily 
coincides with the best interests of the state. The federal government 
uncomfortably became the mediator of domestic relationships in an 
explicit and highly political way. In Walter’s case, a child’s decision to 
petition for asylum for political reasons placed his wishes in direct 
confrontation with a parent’s right to determine the proper living 
environment for the child.  
Polovchak v. Meese is also a critical precursor to contemporary 
context affecting unaccompanied children because of the politicization of 
the migrant child and how these conditions shape the choices available to 
youth. As with the notorious case of Elian Gonzales in 2000, the notoriety 
of Walter’s asylum petition reached the floor of the U.S. Senate and the 
news media.§§§ Particularly during the Cold War era, the political 
                                                          
§§§
 While the INS (now ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement) considers Cuban 
nationals as a unique category of political refugee, Elian’s alien presence revolved 
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implications of revoking Walter’s grant of asylum and returning him to his 
parents would have adversely affected the United States as a nation of 
refuge and reliability. However, in the circuit court’s view recognizing 
parents’ unchecked right to remove their children from the United States 
forcibly would unnecessarily commodify children as property of their 
parents, subjecting children exclusively to the decisions of their parents, 
instead of recognizing children as individual rights holders. It is important 
to recall that there were no special provisions or procedures in the 
immigration court enlisted to treat Walter any different from an adult 
asylum seeker, yet the court’s rulings had real implications on the 
feasibility of the Polovchak family’s future visitations and communication. 
The Asylum Office and Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), 
which adjudicate asylum petitions, do not have authority to make custody 
determinations. However, by granting Walter political asylum in the 
absence of his parents’ consent, the court’s ruling had significant 
implications for parental custody and family unity.   
Because of Walter’s status as a minor, the case raises concerns 
about the child’s independent relationship to the state.26As Evelyn Glenn 
convincingly argues, independence is a “key ideological concept 
anchoring citizenship,” manifested in rights such as property ownership, 
voting, and recognition as decision makers.27(p27) At the same time the 
family becomes the mediator of the state’s investment in the child as a 
future citizen. Because of this presumed dependence, children must rely 
on their parents as proxies before the law, restricting their independent 
access to the state.17,28-30  In Polovchek v. Meese, Walter’s wishes directly 
contradicted his parents’ decisions about their minor child, which unsettles 
the state’s perception that children are necessarily and exclusively 
dependent and that children cannot forge an independent relationship with 
the state. In this view, to claim political agency (in the form of a political 
asylum petition), Walter must be shorn of his kinship ties and become a 
dependent of the state.  
Walter’s independent desire to remain in the United States in spite 
of his parents’ desire for his return to the USSR marks a deviation in the 
social norms of a dependent child. The site of the family as mediator of the 
law for the child was called into question. Walter’s illegality and physical 
                                                                                                                                                               
around his status as a dependent minor, who under U.S. immigration law could not 
independently stand before the law. Declining a congressional offer for political asylum, 
Elian’s father, still residing in Cuba, requested Elian’s immediate return. Despite a 
political asylum application filed on his behalf by his uncle, Elian was ultimately 
repatriated to Cuba, though only after an armed raid by immigration officers “freed” Elian 
from the captivity of his extended family members in Miami. 
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presence in the absence of his family complicated the state’s response—
which was to bounce Walter between legal systems that struggled to 
respond to the state’s diverging obligations to provide sanctuary (via 
immigration law), to not intervene in family matters, and to ensure the 
safety and well-being of children (via family law). Because of his status as 
a child and as an unauthorized migrant, Walter’s case crossed over 
multiple domains of the law that conflict in the treatment of and obligation 
to a child.  
Were the child in question an adult with recognizable rights, 
agency, and a defined relationship to the state, the circumstances would 
be quite different. Take Walter’s sister Nataly, who maintained her own 
legal status and who was already positioned in the upper end of “an age 
range in which a minor may be mature enough to assert certain individual 
rights that equal or override those of his parents” in contrast to Walter 
who, at age 12, the court identified at “the lower end of an age range.”25 
Walter Polovchak’s case bounced between state and federal courts 
involving seven different lawsuits until the asylum adjudication process 
was complete on the eve of his eighteenth birthday in 1985. His right to 
protection in the form of political asylum had augmented with his age. It 
was reasoned that, as an adult, Walter was legally allowed to make his 
own decisions. In the U.S. Senate chamber, legislators celebrated 
Walter’s eighteenth birthday with a “birthday party of freedom” in his 
honor. 
 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status   
Cases such as Walter Polovchak and Elian Gonzalez have given rise to 
new legal avenues that seek to remedy the legal and institutional tensions 
that emerge in a child’s independent and unlawful presence in the United 
States. Historically, the state has defined and positioned unaccompanied 
youth largely through the law, or by legislating citizenship, labor, or 
eligibility for government programs.31-33 Shifts in immigration law for 
unaccompanied children have begun to guarantee some measure of legal 
relief for minors through the introduction of Special Immigrant Juvenile 
(SIJ) status. While SIJ has existed since the early 1990s, advocates have 
increasingly used this tool since 2000.  
The SIJ legislation initially emerged when child welfare advocates 
in Santa Clara County, California, began applying for amnesty under the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) for unauthorized 
children who were dependents of the Santa Clara County’s Department of 
Children and Family Services (DCFS). In an interview with one of the 
drafters, he explained, “When the [immigration] amnesty came, I was 
17
Heidbrink: Unintended Consequences
Published by DigitalCommons@The Texas Medical Center, 2014
working with twenty children dependent on DCFS who qualified for 
amnesty. I, as the prudent parent and as the guardian ad litem, thought I 
had the right to apply for them, and so I applied for all of the children in the 
Santa Clara child welfare system. I got most of them through, but one 
immigration officer refused the last two children. The legislation emerged 
as a clean-up measure. The initial impact was not that much. It was 
relatively obscure at the time” (personal interview). 
Even amid a growing anti-immigrant climate in the late 1980s, the 
SIJ legislation was remarkably inclusive of unauthorized children and 
might have served as a legal remedy for cases like Walter Polovchak in 
the 1980s. Early provisions of the law stipulated that unauthorized youth 
must be (1) a dependent of the juvenile court, (2) deemed eligible for long-
term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and (3) a youth 
for whom return to his or her home country is not in the best interests of 
the child (INA, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J) (2003)). The legislation did not 
require the abuse or neglect to occur in U.S. territory or that the offending 
parent has legal status. Furthermore, SIJ initially included children who 
had never been involved with the immigration system, though this was 
amended in the 1997 revision amid concerns about potential abuse of SIJ.  
While in many ways SIJ is consistent with immigration law’s view 
that children are necessarily dependent, it does open a critical window 
through which advocates began to push for expanded rights of children 
and initially a more nuanced perspective on migrant children. SIJ is the 
only provision in immigration law that considers the best interests of the 
child, creating a unique hybrid of state courts and federal immigration law, 
which provides certain unauthorized children with an avenue to 
citizenship. The mechanism of the best interests standard with the SIJ 
petition is one of the only ways by which the voice of the child might figure 
into immigration proceedings. While SIJ might suggest recognition of 
children as independent social actors or agents at least of their own 
migration, initial discussions of SIJ applicants operated on the assumption 
that children could not be responsible for migration decisions, whether 
lawful or unlawful. In the SIJ regulations the INS insisted, “A child in need 
of the care and protection of the juvenile court should be precluded from 
obtaining Special Immigrant Status because of the actions of an 
irresponsible parent or other adult.”15(p243) In the INS’ view not only could 
the migrant child not make autonomous migratory decisions but also the 
child’s unlawful presence was evidence of the condemnable behavior of 
the child’s parents.  
However, SIJ is an insufficient remedy for unauthorized children in 
the United States. As Ani Ajemian reminds us, “While this opportunity for 
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legal status [via SIJ] appears an appropriate solution to the 
unaccompanied child problem, it is still fairly narrow in its application and 
fails to take into account a number of child-specific harms no less 
deserving of protection.”34(p25) Unaccompanied migrant children may also 
seek political asylum, but the obstacles are significant. As mentioned 
previously, the rules of evidence and testimony do not distinguish a child 
from an adult, forcing children to meet the levels of detail and credibility 
standards of adults. Further, immigration law does not easily recognize 
child-specific persecution, including social phenomena such as child 
soldiers, street children, youth resisting gang membership, or even youth 
as political activists. Attorneys have experienced some success in 
petitioning for children by rooting their legal claims in discourses of human 
rights instead of framing their claims as child-specific persecution.**** U.S. 
immigration law, just as international refugee law, has failed to keep pace 
with contemporary forms of persecution and in recognizing young people 
as social actors.35 
While Congress’s original intent in SIJ was to defer to the expertise 
of the juvenile court in determining the best interests of the child, conflicts 
ensued over jurisdiction.36†††† The state court may make 
recommendations on the proper care and best interests of the child, at 
times finding the child a dependent of the court. However, when the 
federal government takes a child into custody, the state court no longer 
maintains jurisdiction over the child regardless of his or her needs, 
because federal immigration proceedings preempt state court 
proceedings. As a result, many state court judges are unwilling to make 
the necessary findings indicating a child is dependent upon the court while 
not providing any services or oversight of the child’s permanency 
planning.  
In addition, while the legislative history gives no indication of a 
distinction between detained and nondetained youth, the INS explicitly 
distinguished between the two populations, stating: “The INS will seek 
revocation of any juvenile court dependency order issued for a detained 
alien juvenile [as such] juveniles are not eligible for long-term foster care 
                                                          
****
 For further discussion, see Bhabha 2002. 
††††
 Hamm cites Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F. 3d 548 (6th Cir. 1999), which found that “state 
courts may still exercise jurisdiction over a neglected or abused immigrant child who has 
been paroled to foster care by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) without 
necessarily interfering with the federal mandate to regulate immigration” (Hamm 2004: 
324). Hamm cites, In re C.M.K., N.W.2d 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), indicating that “once 
INS had taken the child into custody, the state court had no jurisdiction over that child 
regardless of need because federal immigration proceedings preempted state 
proceedings” (Hamm 2004: 324).  
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because of their federal detention.”15(p244) The INS argued that state courts 
could not find a child dependent if that child was under the care and 
custody of the federal government, in practice, preventing detained 
children from seeking SIJ. Although the 1997 amendments clarified that 
no distinction should be made between detained and nondetained youth, 
the vestiges of this distinction persist in practice in the contemporary 
relationship between ICE, ORR, and state courts whereby detained youth 
who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected do not necessarily have 
open access to family courts to protect them.‡‡‡‡ They face significant 
political and economic resistance from state welfare authorities, judges, 
and state’s attorneys involved in state court proceedings.  
Following numerous complaints and lawsuits, the U.S. Congress 
revisited SIJ in subsequent efforts to clarify its intent in 1997, 2003, and 
2009. These court cases and legislative modifications clarified some of the 
jurisdictional issues, accelerated or resolved delays in processing 
applications, attended to age-out provisions, which deemed youth with a 
pending application who reached eighteen as ineligible, and addressed 
issue of “specific consent” procedures.§§§§  
In 2008, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
(TVPRA) replaced the language “eligible for long-term foster care due to 
abandonment, abuse, or neglect” with “reunification with one or both 
parents is not viable due to abandonment, abuse, neglect or a similar 
basis” (Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008), INA 101(a)(27)(J)). This 
modification broadened the eligibility for SIJ for children who could not 
reunify with both parents to children who could not reunify with only one 
parent. In other words, in theory, a child feeling abuse by one parent in her 
home country could reside with a non-abusive parent in the U.S. However, 
in practice, one-parent SIJ findings have been difficult to secure.37  
Since the early 2000s, the number of successful SIJ petitions has 
spiked. In fiscal year 2005, USCIS approved 660 SIJ petitions.38 The 
number rose to 1590 in fiscal year 2010 and to 3434 approved petitions in 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡
 See Gao v Jenifer (1999). See Heidbrink 2014. 
§§§§
 The Department of Homeland Security entered into a Settlement Agreement in 2008. 
Settlement Agreement, Perez-Olano v. Holder, No. CV 05-3604 (C.D. Cal. 2010), 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Legal%20Settlement%20Notices%20and%20A 
greements/Perez-Olano%20v%20Holder/Signed_Settlement_Agreement.pdf. Prior to 
Perez-Olano v. Holder, children in actual or constructive federal custody required specific 
consent from DHS/ICE before proceeding into state court for a dependency finding. 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (West 2012). In January 2008, a federal district court in 
California decided that unaccompanied children were not required to seek “specific 
consent” from ICE prior to entering state court in petitions for SIJ. Perez-Olano v. 
Gonzalez, 248 F.R.D. 248, 264 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
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fiscal year 2013.39 This increase reflects a rise in the number of 
unaccompanied children detained in the U.S. and their zealous advocates 
who have sought SIJ on behalf of their clients. The rise also reflects 
proactive child welfare services in jurisdictions like Los Angeles County 
that pursue immigration relief on behalf of their young charges.  
Despite various revisions, the fundamental principle underlying SIJ 
has only concretized:  children claiming SIJ must be shorn of kinship ties 
and become dependents of the state (via its proxy as the ORR or the 
juvenile court).***** Under SIJ a child forfeits any right to petition for his or 
her parents or siblings to immigrate. Further, since a special immigrant 
juvenile status recipient is “no longer the ‘child’ of an abusive parent, the 
CIS (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) may assert that he or she 
no longer has any sibling relationship with brothers and sisters.”40(p9) As 
such, SIJ suffers from a “legal aconsanguinity” in which “immigration 
policies nullify legal legitimacy of some kinship ties.”41(p32-33),42(p427)††††† 
Not only does SIJ prohibit the simultaneity of allegiance to kinship 
networks and to the state, but also requires children seeking SIJ to, in 
effect, sustain legal charges against their parent or parents. Children who 
are abused, abandoned, or neglected by one parent become a public 
charge of the state, a relevant factor in the parent’s petition for legal relief. 
If a child receives SIJ status, the immigration court may deem the parent 
as exhibiting moral turpitude, an irreconcilable value with granting of legal 
status and citizenship to the parent.  
 The question arises: Are attorneys creatively pursuing SIJ on behalf 
of children for whom this form of legal relief is not well-suited? Is the long-
term damage to social relationships of unaccompanied children an 
unintended side-effect of an ill-suited legal process? Attorneys must 
balance their professional commitment to zealously advocate on behalf of 
their clients with recognition that the complex experiences of migrant 
children do not easily fit into the few forms of immigration relief available to 
them. A seasoned immigration attorney observed, “It’s like forcing a 
                                                          
*****
 It is important to note that SIJ in state court does not necessarily require the 
termination of parental rights, though it does happen with frequency. 
†††††
 A child granted SIJ status could apply for a sibling but must first become a 
naturalized U.S. citizen, which requires a five-year waiting period following the child’s 
adjustment of status to a legal permanent resident, and must be over twenty-one before 
applying for the sibling(s) to immigrate to the United States. Currently, there is a backlog 
of over ten years for sibling petitions of U.S. citizens. Immigration law is very clear that a 
child granted SIJ status cannot petition for his or her parent(s), stating “no natural parent 
or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this 
subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, 
privilege, or status under this chapter” (INA, 8 U.S.C, §1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II)).  
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square peg into a round hole because it is the only hole we have. Instead, 
we need to drill more holes” (personal interview). Forced to navigate this 
convoluted and ethically murky terrain, attorneys are routinely placed in 
positions of power over children and their narratives. Attorneys routinely 
must grapple with how to distill a child’s narrative into the requisite 
eligibility criteria without reifying the child victim into the law. In 
representing unaccompanied migrant children in SIJ proceedings, 
attorneys require a nuanced and culturally-informed approach, recognizing 
the potential consequences of pursuing SIJ, while, at the same time, 
advocating for new forms of legal relief that better reflect the complexity of 
children’s experiences.  
 
“Who are the perpetrators? Who are the victims?” 
To illustrate the tensions that emerge with SIJ, I provide three 
ethnographic vignettes that represent trends from my research with 
unaccompanied children and their families. These narratives balance the 
unique and diverse experiences of youth migrants with the themes 
identified during a larger study from which this article emerges.3  
Lucia‡‡‡‡‡, a 34 year old Mexican woman, was convicted for a 
series of shoplifting offenses and sent to jail, leaving her daughter Leticia 
as a dependent of the court. Following Lucia’s release, she later told me, 
“I thought Leticia would be better without me. I had no money, nowhere to 
live, and no papers” (personal interview). A child protective services (CPS) 
agency petitioned for SIJ for Leticia based on abandonment by her 
mother. Lucia eventually secured employment and had two more children 
with her U.S.-citizen husband. In evaluating her petition to adjust her 
status, USCIS discovered that Leticia received SIJ and claimed that on the 
grounds of moral turpitude of abandoning her child, Lucia’s application for 
lawful permanent residency was denied. The legal issues facing 
unaccompanied children, whether detained or not, have grave implications 
for the entire family system. “Who are the perpetrators? Who are the 
victims? It is hardly ever clear. . .and these families don’t have the money 
to clean this up,” lamented a social worker (personal interview).  
Johanna’s letter to her mother which opened this article explaining 
her inability to remit money speaks to how youth are caught between 
familial obligations, legal permanency via the state, and the subsequent 
institutional practices shaping their everyday lives. In initial meetings with 
her attorneys, Johanna did not believe her mother had abused or 
neglected her. “I did what I wanted to do. My mom did not control me. She 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡
 Following disciplinary custom, I use pseudonyms for all research participants. 
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worked hard to provide for us. My problems are my responsibilities. It has 
nothing to do with her” (personal interview). Unbeknownst to her mother, 
Johanna had been sexually abused by a neighbor, and on the basis of her 
mother’s failure to protect Johanna from the repeated abuse, attorneys 
identified Johanna as eligible for SIJ. Initially resistant, Johanna asked, 
“She is not a bad person. She didn’t know. How could she do anything to 
stop it?” Johanna maintained a deep emotional bond to her mother and 
her younger siblings, though a relationship complicated by her history of 
abuse and her rebelliousness during her pre-teen years. Gradually 
understanding that her release from detention and placement in foster 
care was contingent upon her claim of SIJ, Johanna astutely explained to 
me, “My mom has to be the bad one. She wants the best for me. She will 
understand” (personal interview). 
Since her placement in federal foster care, Johanna has been 
reluctant to explain that she cannot extend her legal status to her mother 
or siblings, instead continuing to promise to bring them to the United 
States. Her inability to remit money to support her family, a restriction of 
the federal foster care program, has only frustrated Johanna’s relationship 
with her mother. “She wonders if I love her anymore. She thinks I have a 
new family” (personal interview). Her mother’s request for financial support 
resulted in the monitoring of their phone calls for six weeks rather than its 
assistance of Johanna in meeting her social and financial obligations to 
her family. Struggling with her inability to assist her mother and three 
siblings, Johanna drafted a letter to convey her ongoing commitment to 
her “real mother” in spite of her inability to fulfill her social obligations to 
them.  
 In meeting with pro bono attorneys who had agreed to represent 
him, Elias, then a 17 year old indigenous youth from San Marcos, 
Guatemala, quietly corrected them: “They trust me to work and not get in 
trouble and to always remember them. They didn’t send me. I came” 
(personal interview). The decision to migrate is often a collective one; and 
while public discourse on unaccompanied children cast them as victims of 
poor or manipulative parental decisions, allowing their children to 
undertake a life-threatening journey across multiple international borders, 
the cultural context of migration proved difficult for Elias’ attorneys to 
comprehend. His attorney later remarked to me, “What parents puts their 
kid in the hands of a criminal, sends them on this treacherous trip, and 
tells them to work? What kind of parent does that? It’s just not right” 
(personal interview). 
During his migration to the U.S., Elias was brutalized by coyotes 
(smugglers) to whom his parents had paid US$7,500 to transport him 
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through Mexico and into the United States. Upon learning he had two 
brothers working in the U.S., the smugglers held Elias for ransom in a 
drop-house in Mexico, threatening to kill him unless his family paid an 
additional US$500 to secure his release. Elias’ attorneys were now 
pursuing SIJ, making several interrelated arguments. First, Elias’ parents 
did not support him attending school, forcing him to drop out at age 10 to 
work on the family farm. Second, when the family’s crop failed two 
consecutive seasons, his parents placed Elias in the hands of human 
smugglers with little regard to Elias’ safety and well-being, instead 
motivated by their own financial interests in their son potential earnings. 
Third, now in the United States, Elias parents obligated him to pay back 
the now $8,000 of accumulated migration debt and ransom plus 8% 
monthly interest.  In effect, as his attorneys argued, Elias’ parents had 
neglected his education and well-being, constructively abandoning him to 
criminals, and continued to abuse him by forcing him to labor for several 
years to pay for the parents’ loans. After nine months in ORR custody, 
Elias recognized that his release was contingent upon securing SIJ, yet he 
could not reconcile his attorney’s depictions of his parents with his 
understanding of their realities and motivations.§§§§§ Elias eventually 
abandoned his claim for SIJ and petitioned for voluntary departure to 
Guatemala.  
Each of these ethnographic vignettes demonstrates the unintended 
consequences of Special Immigrant Juvenile status and the ways that 
children are forced to choose between kinship ties, legal and imagined, 
and the legal status provided by the state. In spite of best intentions, SIJ 
fails to consider the complex, transnational relationships between migrant 
children and their families, ignoring the multiple and simultaneous 
obligations to one’s own future but also to one’s family’s survival. For 
Lucia, her daughter Leticia’s SIJ petition became evidence against her 
fitness as a parent. For Johanna, the effects of SIJ reverberated long after 
she secured legal status, calling into question her allegiances to her 
mother and belonging to her family in spite of her physical separation. 
Plagued by guilt and limited by institutional interventions, Johanna 
struggled to reconcile her past with her future. Recognizing the precarious 
                                                          
§§§§§
 One of the few benevolent aspects of immigration law in regards to children allows 
for their release from detention to a family member or sponsor while they continue in 
removal proceedings. While his two brothers completed the family reunification process, 
ORR deemed them as not viable placements, leaving Elias in custody for several 
months.  Because of his age of 17, there were no federal foster care programs who were 
willing to accept Elias without having secured legal status, as his funding would “run-on” 
on his 18th birthday. 
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and compromising position which SIJ might place him, Elias evaded the 
“choice” to remain in the U.S. by returning to Guatemala. SIJ provides 
critical protection and security for children like Leticia, Johanna, and Elias 
who have been abused, abandoned or neglected, yet attention must be 
paid to the unintended and long-term consequences of manufacturing a 
choice between the family and the state, a choice which fails to reflect the 
complex and fluid relationships of some transnational families.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that changes in immigration law for 
unaccompanied children, including provisions for SIJ status, have shifted 
the relationship between the state, the family, and the child, positioning 
the state at odds with lived kinship structures. Without an individual 
relationship to the state or recognition of their legal rights, unauthorized 
youth are forced to choose between the state (and partial citizenship) and 
existing kinship ties. By interrogating legal interventions, such as political 
asylum and SIJ, this article argues that the forms of legal relief available to 
migrant children fail to recognize the social agency of young people who 
challenge romanticized notions of childhood and social norms of the 
nuclear, geographically-fixed family. In response to the independent 
presence of unaccompanied children, the state provides care for youth 
including food, shelter, and medical attention; yet simultaneously, due to 
their unauthorized entry, state institutions initiate deportation proceedings 
against unaccompanied youth. As such, youth encounter the state as both 
paternal protector and punishing regulator. The policies and practices of 
the state in response to the presence of unaccompanied children reveal 
how the state operates through an ideal of a unified entity yet splinters into 
a multipronged labyrinth with potentially conflicting objectives for solving 
the “problem” of migrant youth. Amid contentious national debates on 
immigration and security, this article argues that the law’s false choice–
between the family and the state–challenges the historic reputation of the 
United States as a place of refuge for the most vulnerable—children.  
An influx of unaccompanied children from Central American to the 
U.S. in 2014, an eightfold increase from the previous year, extends the 
urgency to effectively respond to the needs of migrant children and youth. 
In recognizing youth as social and collective actors, the following policies 
are critical: 
1. U.S. immigration law must recognize children’s legal rights to 
due process and protection. Appointing attorneys and guardians 
ad litem to children at the government’s expense is an essential 
step in allowing children a fair opportunity to present their claims for 
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legal relief.  
2. U.S. immigration law must incorporate a best interests 
standard. Consistent with both international law and best practices 
in domestic child welfare, meaningfully incorporating a best 
interests standard into immigration law will allow for the 
consideration of the safety and well-being of migrant children 
beyond the few forms of legal relief available to them.  
3. U.S. immigration law must permit immigration status to flow 
from a minor-child to parent. Allowing legal status to flow from a 
minor child to a nonabusive parent would guard against the 
separation of children from their families. This policy would impact 
not only SIJ beneficiaries but also over 4 million mixed-status 
families residing in the U.S.43   
4. Refugee law is in need of urgent and comprehensive reform. 
The changing nature of conflict, the shifting role of the nation-state, 
the development of powerful state-like actors including gangs and 
cartels, and child specific harms such as forced recruitment into 
gangs and armed forces, all pose challenges to current 
configurations of international refugee law and by extension, U.S. 
immigration law.  Expanding refugee protections to reflect these 
changes not only will better protect children, but also will recognize 
the dynamic and fluid nature of transnational families in an 
increasingly global society.  
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